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The European Union (EU) is an open market economy, and against the rise 
of protectionism globally, the ‘Global Europe: Competing in the world’ 
communication of European Commission in 2006 reflected the EU perspective 
that Free Trade Agreements as alternatives can go further and faster in promoting 
openness and integration, by tackling issues which are not readily available for 
multilateral negotiations and by preparing the stepping stones for the next level of 
multilateral liberalization.
After the prolonged negotiations and the EU’s legislative processes, the European 
Parliament gave its consent to both agreements of European Union – Vietnam 
Free Trade Agreement and Investment Protection Agreement on 12 February 
2020. Those bilateral instruments promote enhanced transparency and regulatory 
best practices that are consistent with existing international norms or standards, 
also an important stepping stone and a show-case for the EU’s longer-term goal of 
a region-to-region (EU - Southeast Asia) trade deal.
Those agreements have established a new two-level judicial structure with the 
strong judicial character (Investment Tribunal System – ITS) which Vietnam has 
accepted via legally binding commitments. It is important for Vietnam to follow 
the good governance standards and the rule of law principles. If the ITS works 
well, it will provide additional safeguards and guarantees to investors whereby 
FDI flows to Vietnam are likely to increase. Finally, the ITS regime provides a 
powerful incentive or a catalyst to review and modernize the domestic legal system 
of Vietnam not only to improve the investment eco-system in Vietnam but to pave 
the way for optimization of its economic potential and competitive power in the 
region (i.e. in the ASEAN).
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There has been a growing number of trade and investment 
agreements across the world1 which include bilateral, international 
and/or regional trade agreements.2 While some of these are specifically 
designed to increase volume of trade and promote investment only, 
others such as the trade agreements which the EU enters into, aim 
also to instill effective dispute settlement mechanisms, sustainable 
development, good governance standards and the rule of law principles 
as core provisions therein. Currently, the EU has the greatest number 
of bilateral trade agreements (BITs) in the world3 and by these BITs 
the EU endeavors to externalize such core principles on which the EU 
Single Market is founded.
These principles which promote good governance and the rule-
of-law-based approach to international trade, investment and dispute 
settlement include inter alia that:
- All laws should be prospective, open and clear (transparency);
- Laws should be relatively stable (stability);
- The making of specific legal provisions should be guided by 
open, stable, clear and general rules (predictability);
- The independence of judiciary must be guaranteed; 
- The principles of natural justice must be observed;
- The courts should have review powers over implementation of 
other other principles;
- The courts should be easily accessible;
- The discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not be 
allowed to pervert the law or justice.4
1 There are more than 2,000 BITs globally and an increasing number of trade 
agreements contain investment protection chapters. Trade Justice Movement. 
Retrieved from https://www.tjm.org.uk/trade-deals/bilateral-investment-treaties 
[accessed 30 January 2021]
2 By the end of 2020, there were 306 regional trade agreements in force. World Trade 
Organisation, Regional Trade Agreements. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm [accessed 30 January 2021]
3 Buchholz K. (2019), ‘Which Countries Have the Most Trade Agreements?’, Free Trade 
- Statista, 12 August 2019. Retrieved from https://www.statista.com/chart/18991/
countries-with-most-trade-agreements/ [accessed 30 January 2021]
4 Sattorova M. (2018), The Impact of Investment Treaty Law on Host States, Hart, p. 22 
citing Raz J., ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’ in Raz J. (1979), The Authority of Law: 
Essays on Law and Morality, Clarendon.
By the inclusion of such standards in BITs and/or FTAs, the 
cardinal aim is to ensure host states’ compliance with reasonableness, 
security of property/assets and contract, transparency and due process. 
Furthermore, these elements of the rule of law and good governance 
inform and underpin the arbitral interpretations of investment treaty 
standards/provisions whereby tribunals in numerous disputes held that 
host states shall guarantee stability, predictability, consistency, and 
effectiveness of legal environment for investment.5
The article firstly provides the background against which the recent 
EU – Vietnam trade and investment agreements were concluded. 
Secondly, it critically examines if and to what extent the current free 
trade agreement between the EU and Vietnam is likely to offer benefits. 
In doing so, the article also provides not only an overview of the key 
procedural steps but also a critique of this dispute settlement framework 
against the aforementioned benchmarks of good governance and the 
rule of law principles. In addition, the article identifies key areas in 
which reform and/or improvements are needed. Finally, the article 
conveys the main conclusions that can be reached based on the critical 
analysis under these thematic areas.
2.1. The EU external trading policy
The European Union (EU) is an open market economy whereby 
external trade accounts for nearly 35% of the EU’s GDP in 2018 and 
had the world’s largest trading power, with the share of 17.8% of the 
global trade in goods and services in 2018.6 As of 05 February 2021, 
foreign trade not only promotes EU welfare, jobs and economic growth 
prospects but also provides EU firms with access to and competitiveness 
in the marketplace by improving productivity and efficiency. That in 
turn gives EU consumers the ability to buy a wide variety and high 
5 Some of the most cited cases include Metalcad v Mexico, Award, 25 August 2000, 
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, (2001) 40 ILM 36; Tecnicas Medioambeintales 
Tecmed SA v Mexico, Award, 29 May 2003, ARB(AF)/00/2, 10 ICSID Rep 130; 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, Award, 1 July 2004, LCIA 
Case No UN 3467; Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic (PCA-UNCITRAL, 
Partial Award, 17 March 2006); Merrill and Ring Forestry L.P. v. Canada, Award, 31 
March 2010, UNCITRAL-ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1.
6 Eurostat (2019), ‘Word Trade in Goods and Services - 2019: An Overview’. 
Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
World_trade_in_goods_and_services_-_an_overview [accessed 05 June 2020]
quality of goods and services.7
The EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) allows the region 
to speak with one voice on matters of international trade policy and 
to leverage the single market to improve access to foreign markets 
for EU companies through the negotiation of trade and investment 
agreements. The Lisbon Treaty,8 which came in force in late 2009, 
brought important changes to the EU’s trade policy process.
Firstly, the trade policy was brought under the EU core principles 
inter alia democracy, rule of law and human rights and natural resources 
sustainability.9 Thus the EU trade policy encompasses not only market 
liberalisation, but is also designed to help EU to export high standards 
for food safety, workers’ rights, the environment and consumer rights 
far beyond its borders.10
Secondly, according to Article 207(1) Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), all aspects of external trade, including 
services, commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign direct 
investment, are under exclusive EU competence.11 The division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States in the area of 
CCP has been finally clarified by Opinion 2/15 of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), concerning the EU-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement (EUSFTA).12 As such provisions on labour rights 
7 Hoekman B. & Puccio L. (2019), ‘EU Trade Policy: Challenges and Opportunities’, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Policy Papers, 2019/06, p. 01. 
Retrieved from https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/61589/RSCAS%20
PP%202019_06.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [accessed 21 May 2020]
8 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, OJ C 306 (17 Dec 2007).
9 Ibid., Art. 10A(2) of Chapter 1 – General Provisions on the Union’s external action: 
“(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the 
principles of international law;”
10 European Commission (12 Sep 2018), ‘President Jean Claude Junker’s State of the 
Union’. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-18-5808_
en.htm [accessed 21 May 2020]
11 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Part 
Five: External Action by the Union, Title II: Common Commercial Policy, Art. 207 
(ex Art. 133 TEC) OJ 115, 09 May 2008, p. 0140-41: “1. The common commercial 
policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to […] the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and 
the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment…”
12 Opinion 2/15 of the Court, 16 May 2017, (ECLI:EU:C:2017:376). Retrieved from http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190727&doclang=EN 
[accessed 06 June 2020]
and environmental protection under the trade agreement fall under the 
EU’s exclusive competence while portfolio investment and investor-
State dispute settlement (ISDS) procedures stated in such agreements 
are subject to ratification by the EU Member States.13
Thirdly, the Lisbon Treaty enhanced the European Parliament 
(EP)’s role by sharing responsibility with the Council for developing 
regulations and extending power over bilateral trade agreements and 
unilateral EU trade policy.14 Particularly, 751 Members of European 
Parliament (MEPs) were given the right to veto and stop the controversial 
international deals that would stifle fundamental freedoms.15 In fact, the 
EP had exercised its Lisbon Treaty powers for the first time in July 2012 
by rejecting an international agreement namely the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA). The ACTA was negotiated by the EU and its 
Member States with the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, 
New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Switzerland to improve the 
enforcement of anti-counterfeiting law internationally. However, when 
it was submitted to the EP for approval and subsequently rejected, it 
could not enter into force in the EU.16
While the mechanisms for democratic decision making in the 
EU has been enhanced by Lisbon Treaty,17 EU trade policy faces 
major challenges, both internally and externally. Although the recent 
13 Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full Court) 16 May 2017: “The Free Trade Agreement 
between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore falls within the 
exclusive competence of the European Union, with the exception of the following 
provisions, which fall within a competence shared between the European Union and 
the Member States:
- the provisions of Section A (Investment Protection) of Chapter 9 (Investment) of
that agreement, […];
- the provisions of Section B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) of Chapter 9; and
- […]”
14 Article 218 (3,a);(10) of the TFEU: “…the Council shall adopt the decision
concluding the agreement:
(a) after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament…
10. The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages
of the procedure”
15 European Parliament, ‘EP after the Lisbon treaty: Bigger role in shaping Europe’.
Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/powers-
and-procedures/the-lisbon-treaty [accessed 22 May 2020]
16 European Parliament (04 July 2012), ‘European Parliament rejects ACTA’, Press
Release. Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20120703IPR48247/european-parliament-rejects-acta [accessed 2 June 2020]
17 European Commission (2009), ‘Explaining the Treaty of Lisbon’, MEMO/09/531.
Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/MEMO_09_531
[accessed 06 June 2020]
statistics have shown that over 70% of European Union citizens 
support the CCP and consider free trade to be positive, many critics 
have paid attention on a threat to employment and a source of rising 
inequalities.18 The exit of the UK from the Union (Brexit)19 has posed 
yet another challenge to the CCP whereby it took parties years to 
agree on a post/Brexit trade rules in the confines of the EU-UK 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). TCA came into force on 
01 January 2021 and provides preferential arrangements in areas such 
as trade in goods and in services, digital trade, intellectual property, 
public procurement, aviation and road transport, energy, fisheries, 
social security coordination, law enforcement and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, thematic cooperation and participation in Union 
programmes.20 While the UK is no longer able to benefit fully from 
what the EU Single Market offers, the TCA goes beyond traditional 
free trade agreements21 and provides a solid basis for preserving 
decades of cooperation based on leveled playing field, rule of law and 
fundamental rights.
On the other hand, external challenges are comprised of the 
need to respond to other big forces in international trade: the US 
administration’s shift towards protectionism, the competitive pressures 
arising from the rapid growth of China (the US and China are the 
biggest trading partners of the EU) and the guarantee for jobs creation 
and growth in the EU. The EU leadership in international trade area 
has urged to reverse global trends towards protectionism, prevent a 
collapse of the multilateral trading system and build a framework of 
rules that addresses the sources of current trade conflicts. Nonetheless, 
the US has expressed it will not be interested; nor will China.22 Despite 
of this, the EU is pressing ahead with its international trade strategy 
based on its fundamental principles and values which are informed by 
18 Hoekman, B. & Puccio L., supra note 7, p. 2. 
19 Following the referendum of 2016, the UK has decided to leave the EU. Retrieved 
from https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/eu-referendum [accessed 30 
January 2021]
20 See, EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: protecting European interests, 
ensuring fair competition, and continued cooperation in areas of mutual interest. 
Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
ip_20_2531 accessed 30 January 2021; also see, https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/948093/TCA_
SUMMARY_PDF.pdf [accessed 30 January 2021]
21 For example, TCA is the first trade agreement that the EU has ever reached allowing 
zero tariffs and zero quotas.
22 Hoekman, B. & Puccio L., supra note 7, p. 3.
inter alia the rule of law, human rights and sustainability.23
Furthermore, in the context of the 21st century globalized trade 
driven by revolutionary technologies and increased flows of investment, 
goods and services, trade issues have prompted countries to engage in 
increasingly complex interactions, creating the need for a platform to 
facilitate and regulate trade relations. Firstly, international trade moved 
beyond the exchange of tangible goods to include services and ideas.24 
Particularly, owing to the significant progress of technology, services 
account for approximately 70% of EU GDP and employment and the 
value of exported services have doubled for 10 years up to €728 billion 
in 201425 and up to €15.3 trillion in 2017 (bigger than the GDP of US).26 
The second key phenomenon affecting trade has been the globalization 
of firms’ value chains whereby intermediate rather than final goods and 
services are also traded internationally.27 Finally, the goods and services in 
digital rather than physical form are sweeping aside barriers of geography 
and distance with more shares in terms of global trade volume and value.28 
A global e-commerce market, estimated to be worth over €12 trillion, 
23 European Commission, ‘EU Trade Policy at Work: Creating Opportunities, Standing 
for Europe’s Values and Interests – 2019’. Retrieved from https://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2019/october/tradoc_158400.pdf [accessed 06 June 2020]
24 Baldwin R. and Rigo D. (2018), ‘The Changing Paradigm of Trade in the 21st 
Century’, Global Challenges, The Graduate Institute Geneva, No. 3. Retrieved from 
https://globalchallenges.ch/issue/3/the-changing-paradigm-of-trade-in-the-21st-
century/ [accessed 06 June 2020]
25 European Commission (2014), Trade for all: Towards a more responsible trade and 
investment policy, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, COM/2015/0497 final, p. 10. Retrieved from https://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf [accessed 21 May 2020]. Also 
see, the World Bank Data. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=EU [accessed 06 June 2020]
26 European Union, The Economy. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/figures/economy_en [accessed 06 June 2020]. The projection of the 
EU GDP indicates that it will shrink slightly - because of the impact of COVID-19 on 
trade – to around €14.6 trillion by 2024. Statista, European Union: share in global gross 
domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity from 2014 to 2024. Retrieved 
from https://www.statista.com/statistics/253512/share-of-the-eu-in-the-inflation-
adjusted-global-gross-domestic-product/ [accessed 06 June 2020]
27 Sturgeon T. J. (May 2013), Global Value Chains and Economic Globalization - Towards 
a New Measurement Framework, Industrial Performance Center, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
documents/7828051/8076042/Sturgeon-report-Eurostat.pdf [accessed 2 June 2020]
28 Leblond P. & Viju-Miljusevic C. (2019), ‘EU trade policy in the twenty-first century: 
change, continuity and challenges’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 26(12), p. 
1836. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2
019.1678059 [accessed 21 May 2020]
brings new opportunities for small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
consumers, but new types of trade barriers and greater concerns about 
the protection of consumers and personal data must be addressed.29
As a result, since 2001 the WTO’s members have been engaged 
in a broad round of multilateral trade negotiations known as the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), which is based on three pillars: market access 
for agricultural products, industrial goods (as ‘non-agricultural’ goods) and 
services; rules on trade facilitation and anti-dumping; and development,30 
all of which are very relevant and important for Vietnam as a developing 
country. However, the realisation of any agreement on liberalization 
modalities became infeasible due to conflict still exists regarding the 
commitments that both developed and developing countries should 
make.31 The potential loss in world trade could be estimated to US$1,064 
billion: not only would the failure of the DDA prevent a US$336 billion 
increase in world trade derived from new tariffs cut, but trends towards 
protectionism would contract world trade by US$728 billion.32
Against this background, the EU remains committed to the WTO 
covered agreements and trade development agenda, stemming from the 
view that a strong multilateral trading system is the most effective means 
of expanding and managing trade for the benefit of all.33 Additionally, the 
29 European Commission, supra note 23, p. 12.
30 Europe Parliament, ‘The European Union and the World Trade Organisation’, Fact 
Sheets on the European Union. Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
factsheets/en/sheet/161/the-european-union-and-the-world-trade-organisation 
[accessed 21 May 2020]
31 Bouet, A. & Laborde, D., ‘The potential cost of a failed Doha Round’, International 
Food Policy Research Institute Issue Brief 56 (Dec 2008), p.2. Retrieved from https://
www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum11_e/doha_to_securemarketaccess.
pdf [accessed 21 May 2020]
32 Ibid., p.8
33 European Commission, ‘Global Europe - Competing in the world - A contribution 
to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy’, COM(2006) 567 final, 4 Oct 2006, 
p. 8. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=COM:2006:0567:FIN:en:PDF [accessed 22 May 2020]. However, note that 
on 29 October 2020, CJEU Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in Joined Cases 
C-798/18 and C-799/18 opined that Article 26 Energy Charter Treaty (multilateral 
treaty on energy) in intra-EU investor-State disputes as inapplicable. Fn. 55: ‘In the 
light of that [Achmea] judgment, it seems to me that, in as much as Article 26 of the 
Energy Charter, which is headed “Settlement of disputes between an investor and a 
Contracting Party”, provides that such disputes may be resolved by arbitral tribunals, 
that provision is not applicable to intra-Community disputes. In my view it may even 
be the case, having regard to the observations made by the Court in that judgment – 
especially in relation to the particular nature of the law established by the Treaties and 
the principle of mutual trust between the Member States –– that the Energy Charter is 
entirely inapplicable to such disputes.’
‘Global Europe: Competing in the world’ communication34 highlighted 
the need to adapt the tools of EU trade policy to new challenges, to 
engage new partners, to ensure Europe remains open to the world and 
other markets open to the EU. In this context, on the one hand, Free 
Trade Agreements as alternatives can go further and faster in promoting 
openness and integration, by tackling issues which are not readily 
available for multilateral negotiations and by preparing the stepping 
stones for the next level of multilateral liberalisation. On the other hand, 
FTAs may carry risks for the multilateral trading system by complicating 
trade, eroding the principle of non-discrimination and excluding the 
weakest economies. The EU also suggested that the new FTAs would 
need to be ‘comprehensive and ambitious in coverage, aiming at the 
highest possible degree of trade liberalisation, including in services and 
investment’.35 Consequently, the EU currently has 79 preferential trade 
agreements in place (fully and partially), 25 agreed but not yet in force 
trade agreements and 29 trade agreements being negotiated with other 
countries.36 One of these agreements is with Vietnam who is the EU’s 
17th largest trade in goods partner and the EU’s second largest trading 
partner in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).37
2.2. Prospect from Vietnam
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a 
dynamic market with some 640 million consumers and ranks as the 
eighth economy in the world. The countries as a group are the EU’s 
third largest trading partner outside Europe, after the US and China, 
with more than €237.3 billion of trade in goods and €85.5 billion 
of trade in services during 2017-2018. The EU is by far the largest 
investor in ASEAN countries which its Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) into ASEAN accounted for €337 billion in 2017.38
34 European Commission, supra note 33, p. 33.
35 Ibid., “[N]ew competitiveness driven FTAs would need to be comprehensive and 
ambitious in coverage, aiming at the highest possible degree of trade liberalisation 
including far-reaching liberalisation of trade in services covering all modes of 
supply...”.
36 European Commission, ‘Negotiations and agreements’. Retrieved from http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/#_
being-negotiated [accessed 19 May 2020]
37 European Commission, Trade and Policy – Vietnam, 07 May 2020. Retrieved 
from https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/vietnam/
index_en.htm [accessed 06 June 2020]
38 European Commission, ‘Countries and regions: Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)’. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
and-regions/regions/asean/ [accessed 19 May 2020]
Ensuring better access for businesses to markets, negotiations for a 
trade and investment agreement between two regions were launched 
in 2007 and postponed in March 2009 due to the divergent levels 
of economic, social and political development between the ASEAN 
Member States. As an alternative, the EU started bilateral negotiations 
with these countries with a view of signing bilateral FTAs, including 
Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and 
Myanmar.39 The trade and investment agreements with Singapore 
were signed on 19 October 201840 and Vietnam on 30 June 201941 so 
far while the talk with others is currently on hold.
The EU and Vietnam established formal diplomatic relations in 
October 1990, and Vietnam has eventually become the EU’s second-
most important trading partner in ASEAN, after Singapore. The main 
EU exports to Vietnam are high-tech products, including electrical 
machinery and equipment, aircraft, vehicles and pharmaceutical 
products while Vietnam’s main exports to the EU relies on footwear, 
textiles and clothing, and agricultural products. In addition, the EU is 
the fifth-largest foreign investor in Vietnam whereby investors from 
the EU have invested a cumulative total of almost US$24 billion in 
Vietnam, spread across 2,133 projects by the end of 2018.42
The EU–Vietnam trade negotiation had commenced in June 2012, 
until the formal conclusion on 02 December 2015 was reached. Following 
the Opinion 2/15 of CJEU43 and in a similar approach for the trade deals 
with Singapore, the result of negotiations was adjusted to create a Free 
Trade Agreement (EVFTA) and an Investment Protection Agreement 
(EVIPA). The European Parliament gave its consent to both agreements 
on 12 February 2020: the EVFTA can be officially concluded by the 
Council and enter into force on 01 August 2020 while the EVIPA will 
further need to be ratified by all EU Member States according to their 
39 European Commission, ‘Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations’, Updated 
February 2020. Retrieved from http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/
december/tradoc_118238.pdf [accessed 19 May 2020]
40 European Commission, ‘Singapore’, Countries and Regions. Retrieved from https://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/ [accessed 22 
May 2020]
41 European Commission, ‘Countries and regions: Vietnam’. Retrieved from http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/vietnam/ [accessed 19 
May 2020]
42 Eurocham - Vietnam, ‘The EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Perspective 
from Vietnam’, 2019 EVFTA Report (Dec 2019). Retrieved from https://www.
eurochamvn.org/The-EVFTA-Report [accessed 22 May 2020]
43 CJEU, supra note 12. 
own national procedures before it can enter into force.44 Only 6 EU 
countries ratified agreement as of February.
The EU trade and investment agreements with Vietnam are 
arguably the most ambitious free trade deal ever concluded with a 
developing country and are strategically important to both parties. For 
the EU, the deal achieves two aims at once: 
Firstly, the bilateral measures and provisions promote enhanced 
transparency and regulatory best practices that are consistent with 
existing international norms or standards.45 These measures include:
- Nearly completed removal of tariff barriers: eliminating over 
99% of customs duties on exports in both directions;
- Dismantling of customs barriers and trade facilitation;
- EU access to Vietnamese public procurement and vice-versa;
- Improved access to Vietnamese service markets: for instance, 
easier access for EU companies to operate in the Vietnamese postal, 
banking, insurance, environmental and other service sectors;
- Promoting sustainable development according to international 
regulations and standards; and
- Investment access and protection; particularly the EVIPA 
establishes new Investment Tribunal System (ITS) to resolve disputes 
between investors and state authorities (which is further analysed in 
next section of this paper).46
Secondly, the agreements are also an important stepping stone and 
a show-case for the EU’s longer-term goal of a region-to-region (EU 
- Southeast Asia) trade deal.47
The EVFTA and EVIPA are the catalyst that can push Vietnam’s 
development in a positive way, becoming a global player at the 
44 European Commission, supra note 37.
45 Woolcock S. (2007), ‘European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements’, 
ECIPE Working Paper No. 03, p.11. Retrieved from http://www.felixpena.com.ar/
contenido/negociaciones/anexos/2010-09-european-union-policy-towards-free-
trade-agreements.pdf [accessed 22 May 2020]
46 European Parliament, ‘EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA)’, Legislative 
Train Schedule - A Balanced and Progressive Trade Policy to harness Globalisation. 
Retrieved from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-
balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-vietnam-fta 
[accessed 22 May 2020]
47 Ibid.
highest level of the world’s economies and exploiting its comparative 
advantages in a smart and responsible manner. The European Trade 
Policy and Investment Support Project (MUTRAP) has predicted 
that, over the implementation period, Vietnam’s economic growth 
will be around 7-8% higher than would have been the case without 
such agreements. Furthermore, Vietnam’s exports to the EU are 
set to be 50 percent higher, with imports also seeing significant 
growth.48 These deals make Vietnam the most promising business 
destination for international companies, not only because of its own 
undeniable potential, but also as a future hub for businesses in the 
ASEAN region.
More importantly, the implementation of the new-generation 
trade and investment agreements will promote institutional reform and 
improve the domestic legal framework with more transparent rules 
in Vietnam. In particular, the EVIPA brings forth innovative dispute 
resolution and investment protection mechanisms to all EU and other 
foreign investors. This in turn will significantly raise their confidence 
and Vietnam’s profile as a safe investment eco-system.49 While it is not 
possible to evaluate the end-result of these agreements with empirical 
evidence yet, it is timely to comment on what will be the pros and cons 
of the legal provisions of and commitments under these agreements 
when they are ratified and fully enforced in Vietnam.
Both the EVFTA and EVIPA contain provisions for dispute 
settlement. Chapter 15 of EVFTA50 and Chapter 3 of EVIPA51 provide 
a number of procedures to avoid and settle disputes between the Parties 
pertaining to the interpretation and application of these Agreements 
with a view to arriving at a mutually agreed solution. This section 
examines the ITS under EVIPA52 as it provides intriguing and different 
features which are designed to avoid long and expensive processes of 
traditional Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). The details of 
dispute settlement under the ITS regime is examined below.
48 Eurocham – Vietnam, supra note 42, p. 21.
49 Ibid., p. 34
50 Retrieved from https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/
tradoc_157375.pdf [accessed 06 June 2020]
51 Retrieved from https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157394.
pdf [accessed 06 June 2020]
52 Sub-section 4 of EVIPA provides the provisions for ITS.
3.1. The Investment Tribunal System (ITS) under EU FTAs
As it is well known, the traditional ISDS mechanisms, for example 
ICSID Convention arbitration and ICSID Additional Facility arbitration 
under the ICSID Convention,53 has been criticised by certain sections 
of the civil society, and by the EU itself in the submission to Working 
Group III of UNCITRAL on the ISDS Reform. The most of these 
concerns encompassed the lack of consistency, coherence, predictability 
and correctness of arbitral decisions; no mechanism under the current 
system to address inconsistent and incorrectness of decisions; lack of 
diversity, independence and impartiality of decision makers in ISDS.54
In order to address these criticisms, the EU’s approach has 
attempted to institutionalise the resolution of investment disputes in the 
FTAs through the inclusion of an Investment Tribunal System (ITS). 
As a result, in the new generation of FTAs fostered by the EU, such 
as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada 
(CETA), the EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement, and the 
EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement, an ITS mechanism is 
now a core component of such agreements.55
This approach has given rise to debates in the framework of the 
conclusion of this treaty. On 7 September 2017, Belgium requested 
the CJEU to render an opinion on the compatibility of the CETA’s 
ITS with EU law, in particular with the exclusive competence of the 
CJEU to provide the definitive interpretation of EU law, the general 
principle of equality, the requirement that EU law is effective, and the 
right to an independent and impartial judiciary.56
Shortly after Belgium’s request, on 13 September 2017, the 
European Commission issued a recommendation for a Council 
Decision authorising the opening of negotiations for a Convention 
establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment 
53 The ICSID Convention is a treaty ratified by 154 Contracting States, which entered 
into force on 14 October 1966.
54 Submission of the European Union and its Member States to UNCITRAL Working 
Group III (18 Jan 2019). Retrieved from https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2019/january/tradoc_157632.pdf [accessed 8 Jun 2020]
55 Croisant G. (29 Jan 2019), ‘CJEU Opinion 1/17 – AG Bot Concludes that 
CETA’s Investment Court System is Compatible with EU Law’, Kluwer Arbitration 
Blog. Retrieved from http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/29/
cjeu-opinion-117-ag-bot-concludes-that-cetas-investment-court-system-is-
compatible-with-eu-law/?doing_wp_cron=1591579574.19928789138793945312
50 [accessed 8 Jun 2020]
56 CJEU Opinion 1/17 (30 Apr 2019), p. 01
disputes, with the aim of setting up a framework for the resolution of 
international investment disputes rather than one bilateral investment 
court for each FTA.57 The European Council then gave its agreement 
on 20 March 2018 through the possibility of replacing the various ITS 
already provided by recent EU FTAs by a single multilateral investment 
court (MIC).58 The idea was also proposed to the Working Group III 
of UNCITRAL that identified the setting up of MIC as an option for 
reform of ISDS.59
Notably, in Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V case,60 the CJEU ruled 
that:
“[…] according to settled case-law of the Court, an international 
agreement providing for the establishment of a court responsible for the 
interpretation of its provisions and whose decisions are binding on the institutions, 
including the Court of Justice, is not in principle incompatible with EU law. 
The competence of the EU in the field of international relations and 
its capacity to conclude international agreements necessarily entail 
the power to submit to the decisions of a court which is created 
or designated by such agreements as regards the interpretation and 
application of their provisions, provided that the autonomy of the EU 
and its legal order is respected.”61
Against this background, Attorney General Bot opined in CJEU 
Opinion 1/17 that a process of disputes resolution between investors 
and States by first instance and appellate tribunals may be compatible 
with EU law only if it has no adverse effect on the autonomy of the 
57 European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the 
opening of negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the 
settlement of investment disputes, COM (2017) 493 final (Brussels, 13 Sep 2017): ‘The 
multilateral investment court initiative aims at setting up a framework for the resolution 
of international investment disputes’. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0493 [accessed 8 Jun 2020]
58 European Council (20 Mar 2018), ‘Negotiating directives for a Convention 
establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of investment disputes’ 12981/17 
ADD 1 DCL 1, Brussels, p.8: “The principal mechanism of the Convention should be that 
the jurisdiction of the multilateral court extends to a bilateral agreement when both Parties to the 
agreement have agreed to submit disputes arising under the agreement to the jurisdiction of the 
multilateral court”. Retrieved from http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-12981-2017-ADD-1-DCL-1/en/pdf [accessed 8 Jun 2020]
59 Croisant G., supra note 55.
60 CJEU Judgment (Grand Chamber) (Case C-284/16 of 5 March 2018). Retrieved from 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=199968 
&pageIndex= 0&doclang= EN&mode=req&dir=&occ= first&part=1&cid=1492350 
[accessed 8 Jun 2020]
61 Ibid., p. 57.
EU legal order.62 That autonomy, which exists with respect both to 
the law of the Member States and to international law, stems from 
the essential characteristics of the European Union and its law. Those 
characteristics have given rise to a structured network of principles, 
rules and mutually interdependent legal relations binding the European 
Union and its Member States reciprocally as well as binding its Member 
States to each other.63 In addition, that autonomy accordingly resides 
in the European Union constitutional framework, which encompasses 
the values set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU): ‘the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities’.64
Therefore, the ITS provided in EU FTAs is fully compatible with 
EU law, provided that it complies with the principle of autonomy of 
EU law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU for the interpretation 
of EU law, the principle of equal treatment and of the requirement 
of effectiveness, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000 in 
particular of the right of access to a court and right to an independent 
and impartial tribunal.65
3.2. Organizational structure and functions of ITS
3.2.1 The Tribunal of First Instance (the Tribunal) and the Appeal Tribunal
The ITS in EVIPA has established a two-level judicial structure, 
the Tribunal of First Instance (the Tribunal) and the Appeal Tribunal.66 
The lack of an effective judicial review of arbitral decisions has 
been one of the most criticised shortcomings of traditional ISDS 
mechanisms. The ITS provides for the possibility to appeal against an 
award rendered by the Tribunal where it is alleged to have erred in 
the interpretation or application of the applicable law, or manifestly 
erred in the appreciation of the facts. The Appeal Tribunal shall, in 
case the appeal is well founded, decide to modify or reverse the legal 
findings and conclusions in the provisional award in whole or part.67 
62 CJEU Opinion 1/17 (30 Apr 2019), p. 108.
63 Ibid., p. 109.
64 Ibid., p. 110.
65 European Commission (30 Apr 2019), ‘Trade: European Court of Justice 
confirms compatibility of Investment Court System with EU Treaties’, Press 
Release. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
IP_19_2334 [accessed 8 Jun 2020]
66 The EVIPA, Art.3.38, 3.39.
67 Ibid., Art.3.54, p. 3.
In other words, the Appeal Tribunal shall apply its own legal findings 
and conclusions to the facts and render a final decision. But if that is 
not possible, it shall refer the matter back to the Tribunal.68
3.2.2. Tribunal members
The ITS has provided for a break from the ad hoc arbitration system 
to a permanent and institutionalised court, whose nine members of the 
Tribunal, respective six members of the Appeals Tribunal are appointed 
in advance by the States parties to the treaty instead of being appointed 
on a case-by-case basis by the investor and the responding State.69
Firstly, members of the Tribunal, as well as the Appeal Tribunals 
are categorised evenly in accordance with their affiliation to the 
Contracting Parties. As for the Tribunal of First Instance, three 
members are nationals of Vietnam, three members are nationals of EU 
Member States, and the remaining three members are third country 
nationals.70 Respectively, the number of members on the Appeal 
Tribunals encompasses two EU nationals and two nationals of Vietnam, 
and two third country nationals.71 Accordingly, national members of 
Vietnam on the Tribunal or Appeal Tribunal are not required to have 
the nationality of Vietnam.72 Secondly, the appointment of members to 
individual panels is the responsibility of the President of the Tribunal, 
herself selected by lot from the pool of third country members.73 
Finally, to guarantee the independence and availability of Tribunals’’ 
members, the Trade Committee will determine the remuneration for 
the retainer and for their activity on panels.74
It is also noteworthy that the appointment of members of the 
Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal is left to the respective Contracting 
Parties, but the selection of all members in Tribunals is assigned to 
68 Ibid., Art.3.54, p. 4.
69 Ibid., Art.3.23.
70 Ibid., Art.3.23, p. 01: “The Committee shall, no later than six months after the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement, establish a list of at least 15 individuals who are 
willing and able to serve as arbitrators. The list shall be composed of three sub-lists:
(a) one sub-list for Viet Nam;
(b) one sub-list for the Union and its Member States; and
(c) one sub-list of individuals who are not nationals of either Party and do not 
have permanent residence in either Party and who shall act as chairperson of the 
arbitration panel.”
71 Ibid., Art.3.39, p. 2.
72 Ibid., supra note 25 & 26.
73 Ibid., Art. 3.38, p. 5.
74 Ibid., Art.3.38, p. 14 and Art.3.39, p. 14.
the Trade Committee established under the Agreement.75 The Trade 
Committee is composed, on the one hand, of the Minister for Trade 
and Industry of Vietnam, and, on the other hand, the EU Trade 
Commissioner.76 Although many structural and procedural details of 
the Committee still need to be worked out, the composition of the 
ITS appears more akin to a politically negotiated compromise than an 
appointment by the respective Contracting Parties.77 Thus, although 
ITS has addressed the frequent criticism over the influence of disputing 
parties on the appointment of a particular panel, it inserts a significant 
element of political influence on investor-state dispute resolution – 
counteracting the objective of depoliticisation that ISDS was designed 
to achieve.78
3.2.3. Ethical requirements
To guarantee the independence of the tribunal, the Agreement 
contains stringent requirements regarding tribunal members’ 
qualifications and impartiality, rules on ethics and conflicts of interests, 
and necessary flexibilities to adapt to an evolving membership.79 The 
members of aforementioned Tribunals shall fulfil the requirements 
in their respective countries for appointment to judicial office, or be 
jurists of recognised competence.80 To that extent, members of both, 
the Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal, shall have demonstrated expertise 
in public international law and, ideally, in international investment 
law, international trade law, and international dispute resolution. 
Additionally, members must not only be independent but also clearly 
appear to be free of any direct or indirect conflict of interest pertaining 
to a particular dispute. The EVIPA provided that ‘upon appointment, 
they shall refrain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert 
or witness’ in any dispute.81
75 Ibid., Art. 3.7, p. 3.
76 Ibid., Art. X.1 of the Chapter on Institutional, General and Final Provisions.
77 Lenk H. (2016), ‘An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade 
and Investment Agreements: A Discussion of the Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam 
and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada’, European Papers, 
Vol. 1(2) 665, p. 668. Retrieved from http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/system/files/
pdf_version/EP_EF_2016_I_033_Hannes_Lenk.pdf [accessed 9 Jun 2020]
78 Ibid.
79 UNCTAD, ‘Reforming Investment Dispute Settlement: A Stocktaking’, IIA 
Issues Note, Mar 2019, Issue 1, p. 13. Retrieved from https://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d3_en.pdf [accessed 12 Jun 2020]
80 The EVIPA, Art.3.38, p. 4.
81 Ibid., Art.3.40, p. 01.
The ethics provision under EVIPA may have some limits. Firstly, 
the ambiguous term of ‘appointment’ may cause unclear understanding 
whether this refers to the appointment of members to a particular panel 
or the appointment as member of the Tribunal. If the former is correct, 
the ethical standard is much less stringent than thus far perceived.82 
Additionally, it is frequent for Tribunal members to handle various 
arbitration cases in parallel, the language of the ethics provision seems 
to be silent on Tribunal members’ involvement in multiple and/or 
simultaneous disputes.83
3.3. Dispute settlement proceedings
An intriguing feature of ITS in resolving disputes under the EVIPA 
is the amicable resolution of disputes to avoid long and expensive 
burden of ISDS.84 The conciliation and mediation mechanisms 
under EVIPA envisage a more flexible evidentiary process aiming to 
provide a fair and independent system. Particularly, EVIPA provides a 
mandatory six-month cooling period before a claim can be submitted 
for arbitration. During this period, the parties should engage in a 
consultation followed by mediation or conciliation. A party can submit 
a notice of arbitration only upon expiration of the cooling period. 
Otherwise, the claim will not be admissible.85
To submit a claim for a dispute under the Agreement, the 
claimant may send a notice of intent to arbitrate within 90 days of 
the submission of the request for consultations, which automatically 
triggers the determination of a respondent within 60 days of the notice 
of intent.86 It allows investor to submit a claim only with regard to a 
breach of obligations under provisions of Chapter 2 of EVIPA. It is 
noteworthy that although there is a substantive protection of market 
access, investor cannot submit a claim against this due to the exclusion 
from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.87
The parties have a choice to submit claims under the rules 
prescribed in the agreement; the rules of ICSID Convention and Rules 
of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, ICSID Additional Facility 
82 Lenk H., supra note 77, p. 672.
83 Ibid.
84 The EVIPA, Art. 3.39.
85 Ibid., Art.3.33(1).
86 Ibid., Art.3.33: “1. If the dispute cannot be settled within six months of the submission of the 
request for consultations and at least three months have elapsed from the submission of the notice 
of intent to submit a claim pursuant to Article 3.32 (Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim)…”
87 Ibid., Art.2.1.
Rules if the former do not apply, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or 
any other rules agreed by the parties.88
In order for a dispute to be resolved under an investment treaty, it 
is important to establish that the arbitral tribunal has been vested with 
the authority to determine their jurisdiction for examining the dispute 
in the present case. The jurisdiction criteria are typically classified as 
condition of consent, jurisdiction ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione 
materiae.89 The definition of the term ‘investor’90 is directly related to 
the jurisdiction ratione personae because the dispute to be settled should 
arise between the investor from a Contracting Party and host State – 
another Contracting Party – either Viet Nam or, in the case of the EU 
Party, either the Union or the Member State concerned pursuant to 
Article 3.32 of the EVIPA.91 Article 3.43 of such Agreement attempts 
to prevent claims from investors who ‘acquired ownership or control 
of the investment for the main purpose of submitting the claim under 
this Section’.
The required conditions for presence of jurisdiction ratione 
materiae are comprised of a legal dispute, the dispute arising from an 
investment and a direct relationship between the relevant investment 
and the dispute. The notion of ‘investment’ under Article 1.2(h) of 
the EVIPA is very broad and covers variety of assets under direct and 
indirect control of an investor. However, Article 1.2(q) attempts to 
deprive illegal investments of treaty protection by requiring that a 
covered investment is inter alia ‘made in accordance with the other 
Party’s applicable law and regulations’. This provision aims to dismiss 
any claim regarding an investment or an investor that violates core EU 
values, or that has violated host State’s laws or international standards 
of responsible investment.
Unlike the UNCITRAL rules on transparency, EVIPA does not 
limit confidentiality pertaining to the access of documents for public,92 
public hearings,93 a matter of right of a non-disputing third party to 
88 Ibid., Art.3.33, p.2.
89
Determining the Jurisdiction of ICSID and Commentary on the Phoenix Case’, 
Mondaq. Retrieved from https://www.mondaq.com/turkey/arbitration-dispute-
resolution/722160/principle-of-good-faith-in-determining-the-juristicdion-of-
icsid-and-commentary-on-the-phoenix-case [accessed 26 May 2020]
90 The EVIPA, Art.3.38, p. (c)(i).
91 Ibid., Art.3.38, p. (f).
92 Ibid., Art.3.46, p. 3.
93 Ibid., Art.3.8, p. 4.
attend,94 and awards of the tribunal.95 The public disclosure of the 
award would improve accountability, predictability and consistency 
in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal creating precedents for future 
decisions. However, the availability of documents in public is subject 
to redaction of confidential or protected information such as business 
secrets and classified government information belonging to the parties. 
There is a great degree of responsibility entrusted on the Tribunal 
to determine on confidentiality of information and to take proactive 
role in cases involving confidential information as unlimited access to 
and disclosure of such information could damage the interest of the 
disputing parties and/or may be a cause to appeal the award.96
Last but not least, in order to guarantee the recognition and 
enforceability of ITS awards, the EVIPA provides that final awards 
shall be binding between the disputing parties.97 The Vietnam 2015 
Civil Procedure Code (CPC) also provides only limited grounds 
for the setting aside of awards to, for instance, personal misconduct, 
procedural improprieties, and the lack of a valid arbitration agreement; 
but do not generally provide for a substantive review of the award.98 
Although the EVIPA refers in this respect to the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 
it is clear to see that the ITS is envisaged to operate more like a 
judicial organ – rather than arbitral – in nature, thus, falling outside 
the scope of that Convention. Other critics have pointed out that 
the enforcement of ITS awards is dependent on the provisions of the 
underlying agreement to which third parties are not bound.99
Given the strong judicial character of ITS which Vietnam has 
accepted via legally binding international investment commitments, 
it is important for Vietnam to transpose these commitments in its 
domestic legal framework to ensure consistency as well as to monitor 
their compliance.
94 Ibid., Art.3.37.
95 Ibid., Art.3.22, p. 2.
96 Jaswant S. S. (2019), ‘Establishment of investment court system under CETA and 
EU-Viet nam FTA and its compatibility with EU law’, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, 
Institute for European Integration, Study Paper No 02/19, pp. 65-66. Retrieved 
from https://europa-kolleg-hamburg.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Study-
Paper-Shilpa-Singh-Jaswant.pdf [accessed 12 Jun 2020]
97 The EVIPA, Art.3.57, p. 01.
98 Vietnam 2015 Civil Procedure Code, Art.439.
99 Jaswant S. S., supra note 96.
According to the statistics by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement Navigator (ISDS), there have been at least eight reported 
investor–state disputes involving Vietnam as a party: three cases were 
decided in favour of Vietnam; one was decided against Vietnam; one 
was discontinued and two cases are still pending.100
Some of the thematic issues and principles were addressed in these 
cases. 
4.1. Principle of good faith in international investment regulations
McKenzie v. Vietnam (2010) Case
McKenzie v. Vietnam was a case arising under the ‘Chapter of 
Investment’ of the 2000 US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement 
(BTA).101 The claimant sought to arbitrate the State’s failure of 
conveying land use rights to permit a mining company to exploit 
the area, instead of the construction of resort located in Binh Thuan 
Province, Vietnam. The tribunal rejected the claimant’s argument, 
upholding Vietnam’s claim that the act of executing agreements with 
the mining company by the investor himself had constituted consent 
to let the mining company utilise the area.102
In determining jurisdiction ratione materiae, the tribunal paid its 
attention to analyse the principle of good faith103 whereby a claimant 
did not act in accordance with the good faith to render his investment 
project he would fall out of the investment protection under the 
100 UNCTAD, ‘Vietnam’, Investment Policy Hub. Retrieved from https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/229/viet-
nam/respondent [accessed 26 May 2020]
101 UNCTAD (2010), ‘McKenzie v. Viet Nam’, Investment Policy Hub. Retrieved from 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/382/
mckenzie-v-viet-nam [accessed 26 May 2020]
102 Nguyen P. D. (12 July 2016), ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in 
Investor-State Arbitration in Vietnam’, International Arbitration Asia. Retrieved 
from http://www.internationalarbitrationasia.com/vietnam-fair-and-equitable-
treatment-in-investor-state-arbitration [accessed 26 May 2020]
103 Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No: ARB/06/05, Award of 
15 April 2009, p. 107: “The principle of good faith has long been recognized in public 
international law, as it is also in all national legal systems. This principle requires parties “to 
deal honestly and fairly with each other, to represent their motives and purposes truthfully, and 
to refrain from taking unfair advantage…”. Retrieved from https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0668.pdf [accessed 26 May 2020]
invoked treaty.104 It is seen that international arbitrations brought up 
this issue in many previous cases, and Phoenix case is undoubtedly one 
of the most notable cases relating to good faith:
“The purpose of the international mechanism of protection of 
investment through ICSID arbitration cannot be to protect investments 
made in violation of the laws of the host State or investments not made in good 
faith, obtained for example through misrepresentations, concealments 
or corruption, or amounting to an abuse of the international ICSID 
arbitration system. In other words, the purpose of international protection 
is to protect legal and bona fide investments.”105
Moreover,
“The protection of international investment arbitration cannot be 
granted if such protection would run contrary to the general principles 
of international law, among which the principle of good faith is of utmost 
importance.”106
As such, in the decision of McKenzie case there was a great 
determination to express the tribunal’s duty as “ensuring that only 
investments that are made in compliance with the international 
principle of good faith and do not attempt to misuse the system are 
protected”. The tribunal further repeated the principle as stated in 
Plama v. Republic of Bulgaria case:
“The principle of good faith encompasses, inter alia, the obligation 
for the investor to provide the host State with relevant and material information 
concerning the investor and the investment. This obligation is particularly 
important when the information is necessary for obtaining the State’s 
approval of the investment…107 Intentional withholding of this information 
is therefore contrary to the principle of good faith.”108
The claimant had submitted a financial dossier to competent 
authority in order to obtain the investment certificate. However, the 
correctness and validity of such a dossier could not be determined 
or justified after the date of investment certificate issuance, even if 
104 McKenzie v. Vietnam, Award of 11 Dec 2013, p. 222. Retrieved from https://www.
italaw.com/cases/2370 [accessed 26 May 2020]
105 Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, supra note 103, p. 100.
106 Ibid., p. 106.
107 Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
Award of 27 Aug 2008, p. 144. Retrieved from https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0671.pdf [accessed 26 May 2020]
108 Ibid., p.145.
there was suspicion of fraud. Thus, the tribunal cited “Nemo auditur 
propriam turpitudinem allegans (nobody can benefit from his own 
wrong)” to judge that the claimant had not complied with the 
condition precedents stated in aforementioned investment certificate, 
which is the framework of defendant’s consent with jurisdiction of 
such tribunal under the applicable BTA.109
The general application of principle of good faith has also been 
highlighted in Inceysa Vallisoletana SL v. El Salvador case as ‘a supreme 
principle, which governs legal relations in all of their aspects and 
content’.110 Such principle therefore has been the object of analysis in 
various cases concerning the dispute between foreign investor and the 
respondent state and it is likely to be relevant to other similar cases in the 
future. More importantly, in international investment law, substantive 
standards of treatment (investment treaty provisions), such as ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’, ‘full protection and security’, ‘protection of 
legitimate expectation’, ‘transparency’, ‘non-discrimination’, ‘national 
treatment’ and ‘most-favoured-national treatment’, are considered 
fundamentally based on good faith, but their content depends on the 
specific contexts in which they are applied.111
4.2. The fair and equitable treatment in investor-state arbitration
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) is a provision commonly 
enshrined in investment agreements despite the absence of a rigid 
definition. The ‘equitable’ treatment was initially referred in the 1948 
Havana Charter for the International Trade Organisation as Article 
11(2) provided that investment (the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and 
technology brought from one Member country to another) should 
be assured ‘just and equitable treatment’.112 Then, the FET has been 
identified as one of the minimum standards of treatment of foreigners 
and of their property, required by international law, a concept which 
109 McKenzie v. Vietnam, supra note 104, pp. 226-49.
110 Inceysa Vallisoletana SL v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award of 2 
Aug 2006, p. 230. Retrieved from https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0424_0.pdf [accessed 27 May 2020]
111 Maniruzzaman M. (30 Apr 2012), ‘The Concept of Good Faith in International 
Investment Disputes – The Arbitrator’s Dilemma’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog. Retrieved 
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was further interpreted in the Waste Management cases.113 Other cardinal 
elements which inform the FET principle include (but not limited to) 
transparency, non-discrimination, due process and non-arbitrariness:
“…the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable 
treatment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful 
to the claimant if the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or 
idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional 
or radical prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an 
outcome which offends judicial propriety – as might be the case 
with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a 
complete lack of transparency and candor in an administrative process. 
In applying this standard, it is relevant that the treatment is in breach 
of representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied 
on the claimant.”114
The FET standards have been invoked in numerous other cases 
where the claims were based on the FET standards under the applicable 
treaty. In addition to McKenzie v. Vietnam case where the claimant 
alleged a contravention of FET principles and a lack of transparency by 
Vietnam, the claimant in DialAsie SAS v. Vietnam case115 also alleged 
breaches of indirect expropriation, fair and equitable treatment and 
full protection and security set forth in the 1992 France – Vietnam 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) by imposing the operating standards 
of a hospital on the nephrology and dialysis facility of DialAsie. The 
international arbitral tribunal accepted Vietnam’s argument that 
DialAsie did not raise any objection during its operation in Vietnam 
and therefore, no expectations of DialAsie arose.116 The tribunal thus 
found in favour of Vietnam and held that the State had not in fact 
imposed unfair criteria on the medical facility of DialAsie, instead 
merely expressed its concern regarding the advantageousness and 
convenience of patients.117
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Bril Nijhoff, Leiden.
117 Nguyen P. D., supra note 102. 
Recofi v. Vietnam118 was another case arising under the France 
– Vietnam BIT, arising out of alleged outstanding payments by the 
Government concerning contracts for sale of foods and other basic 
comodities by claimant to both private and State-owned entities in 
Vietnam when the country faced food shortages in 1987. On 28 
September 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered an award declining 
their jurisdiction to decide the dispute.119 Despite the confidentiality 
of the award, the legal reasoning of arbitration’s conclusion was 
summarized by the Swiss Federal Tribunal when it examined Recofi’s 
application for annulment:
“This being so, the scrutiny of the case will begin with an inquiry 
as to the meaning of the word ‘investment’ as defined at Art. 1(1) of 
the BIT… However, there is no need to enter into this debate here; 
indeed, the issue is first to define the expression ‘investment’ as it 
appears in the BIT at issue and not as defined pursuant to other bilateral 
treaties. Second, there is no rule requiring an arbitral tribunal to heed 
decisions previously taken by other arbitral tribunals on the same issue, 
as they are not binding precedents. Third, as this arbitration is under 
the UNCITRAL rules, the criteria germane to ICSID arbitrations are 
not to be taken into consideration.”120
However, it could be perceived in this case whether the FET 
standards had been breached in considering the fact that there was a 
reasonable expection by a non-native investor to receive reimbursement 
from the State when it met the criteria set forth by the State itself in 
domestic legal framework and mechanism on public debt management.121
There is no full consistency in the application and interpretation 
by arbitral tribunals of the FET obligations. This patchwork of 
approaches are a result of a variety of formulated standards and 
different factual situations. Furthermore, in the absence of an appellate 
review, tribunals may evaluate the FET standard only in terms of an 
investor’s expectations, without due consideration given to a State’s 
118 RECOFI v. Viet Nam (2013). Retrieved from https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/
investment-dispute-settlement/cases/554/recofi-v-viet-nam [accessed 3 Jun 2020]
119 Tran N-H. T. (12 Aug 2017), ‘The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s decision in Recofi v. 
Vietnam: a case study’, Lalive (Ho Chi Minh City). Retrieved from https://newsite.lalive.
law/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/12.08.2017_NhuHoangTranThang12Aug2017_
ENVN.pdf [accessed 27 May 2020]
120 Judgment of the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland No. 4A_616/2015 (20 Sep 
2016), s. 3.2.2. Retrieved from https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw10121.pdf [accessed 27 May 2020]
121 Nguyen P. D., supra note 102.
wider political and social obligations. The challenge for investment 
treaty negotiators is to enshrine this in new treaty language or to use it 
to clarify existing treaty provisions. In other words, investment treaties 
should continue considering how to formulate the FET standards 
and obligations – or provide an agreed interpretation to existing FET 
clauses that would guide the tribunals and address existing and future 
problems of its application.122
4.3. Transparency in investor-state arbitration
Trinh and Binh Chau v. Viet Nam (I) (2004); and Trinh and Binh 
Chau v. Viet Nam (II) (2014)
Mr. Trinh Vinh Binh – a Dutch national of Vietnamese descent 
– and his company Binh Chau JSC. (Trinh and Binh Chau) had filed 
a claim against the Vietnamese government before the UNCITRAL 
arbitral tribunal for the alleged unlawful confiscation of real estate and 
other claimants’ assets without compensation, including the criminal 
conviction of Mr. Trinh, with the claimed value of approximately 
US$100 million. The legal framework of this lawsuit was the 1994 
Vietnam-Netherlands Bilateral Investment Treaty. Accordingly, 
disputing parties agreed to settle the dispute with an undisclosed 
amount of compensation.123
However, by 2014 the claim was brought by Mr. Trinh against the 
Vietnamese government for the breach of a settlement of a previous 
claim under the same BIT. The arbitration proceedings were seated in 
London and administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, with 
hearings organised at the ICC headquarters in Paris in August 2017. 
The arbitral tribunal rendered an award ordering Vietnam to pay Mr. 
Trinh Vinh Binh and his company Binh Chau JSC a total amount of 
approximately US$37.5 million, including damages for expropriation 
of property, moral damages, costs of arbitration and related legal fees.124
122 UNCTAD (2012), ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’, UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreement II, UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, pp. 90-92. 
Retrieved from https://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf [accessed 3 
Jun 2020]
123 UNCTAD, ‘Trinh Vinh Binh and Binh Chau Joint Stock Company v. Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam (I)’, Investment Policy Hub. Retrieved from https://
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binh-chau-v-viet-nam-i- [accessed 24 May 2020]
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In a press release, the Vietnam Ministry of Justice refused to disclose 
any news regarding the final award rendered for this dispute.125 The 
content of this award along with other dispute-relevant information was 
supposed to be kept confidential by all parties although the government 
had promised to respond to a lawsuit with full transparency.126 
The inclusion of the new Investment Tribunal System (ITS) 
in the EVIPA is an assurance that serious concerns about ‘lack of 
transparency’ in the current ISDS mechanism are being addressed.127 
Particularly, Article 3.46(1) of the EVIPA provides for the application 
of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules to ISDS proceedings: “The 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules apply to disputes under this Section, 
subject to paragraphs 2 to 8.” In comparison with the EU – Singapore 
Investment Protection Agreement (ESIPA), Article 3.16 and Annex 8 
(‘Rules on Public Access to Documents, Hearings and the Possibility 
of Third Persons to Make Submissions’) of such agreement adopts 
the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules only to match the terms of the 
ESIPA ISDS procedure.
Furthermore, greater transparency in the proceedings is also reflected 
in the EVIPA’s treatment of third-party funders. While the ESIPA 
requires foreign investors to disclose merely the identities of the third-
party funder,128 the EVIPA goes a step further by mandating disclosure 
of the “the existence and nature of the funding arrangement”.129 
Thus, the “incorporation-by-reference” methodology without any 
major change and provisions of third party funding applied in EVIPA 
will provide complete transparency and allow a third party to deeply 
involve in the proceedings.
125 Vietnam Ministry of Justice, Press Release dated 12 Apr 2019. Retrieved from 
https://moj.gov.vn/qt/thongtinbaochi/Lists/ThongCaoBaoChiVeCacSuKien/
Attachments/34/Thong%20cao%20bao%20chi.pdf [accessed 6 Jun 2020]
126 Tuoi Tre News (31Aug 2017), ‘Vietnamese government promises transparency 
in businessman’s lawsuit’. Retrieved from https://tuoitrenews.vn/news/
business/20170831/vietnamese-government-promises-transparency-in-
businessmans-lawsuit/41277.html [accessed 6 Jun 2020]
127 Ibid.
128 ESIPA, Art.3.8: “1. Any disputing party benefiting from third party funding shall notify the 
other disputing party and the Tribunal of the name and address of the third-party funder.”
129 EVIPA, Art. 3.37: “1. In case of third-party funding, the disputing party benefiting 
from it shall notify the other disputing party and the division of the Tribunal, or 
where the division of the Tribunal is not established, the President of the Tribunal 
the existence and nature of the funding arrangement, and the name and address of the third-
party funder.” (itslis added).
Last but not least, the status of transparency will be likely to change 
in not only EVIPA, but also other treaties whereby Vietnam is one of 
parties since the birth of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (‘Rules on Transparency’), 
effective as of 1 April 2014.130 Although Vietnam is not yet a 
member of the 2014 United Nations Convention on Transparency 
in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (New York, 2014) (the 
“Mauritius Convention”)131 and thus not expressly bound by the 2014 
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, such Rules on Transparency have 
been incorporated in the new 2013 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
and automatically apply to disputes arising out of treaties concluded as 
of 1 April 2014.132
5.1. Coordination mechanism of state agencies in investment-based 
disputes
As Vietnam has taken a strategic approach to international trade133 
and been increasingly integrated into the global economy so have the 
growth in international trade and investment in Vietnam.134 In tandem 
with these developments the risk of disputes arising in trade and 
130 The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration 
are a set of procedural rules for making publicly available information on investor-
State arbitrations arising under investment treaties.
131 The United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration (New York, 2014) (the ‘Mauritius Convention on Transparency’), came into 
force on 18 October 2017, is an instrument by which Parties to investment treaties 
concluded before 1 April 2014 express their consent to apply the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.
132  UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (with new article 1, paragraph 4, as adopted in 
2013): “4. For investor-State arbitration initiated pursuant to a treaty providing for 
the protection of investments or investors, these Rules include the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (“Rules on 
Transparency”), subject to article 1 of the Rules on Transparency.”
133 Perez S. (2018), ‘The Strategic Vision behind Vietnam’s International Trade Integration’, 
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 02, p. 3–38. Retrieved from 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/186810341803700201 [accessed 05 
June 2020]
134 Imports, exports and foreign direct investment have shown a steady and consistent 
growth in Vietnam since the country joined the WTO in 2007. World Trade 
Organisation, Vietnam – Trade Profile. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/trade_profiles/VN_e.pdf, accessed 05 June 
2020. For an a detailed analysis of trade surplus in Vietnam see, Trading Economics, 
Vietnam Balance of Trade, https://tradingeconomics.com/vietnam/balance-of-
trade [accessed 05 June 2020]
business spheres would also increase.135 Regarding the negotiation of 
new investment treaties, Vietnam has shown to be more prudent. It has 
embarked upon a new generation of FTAs which may not only minimize 
the abuse of FTA-based ISDS mechanism by foreign investors, but 
also promote sustainable development through responsible investment 
conduct rather than merely focus on the protection of investors.136
During the past ISDS cases, Vietnam was confronted by challenges 
and difficulties similar to those identified by other developing countries 
responding to investor-state disputes, including a lack of coordination 
mechanisms among a lead agency and relevant agencies, inexperience 
in ISDS processes and shortcomings in the national legal systems for 
foreign investment.137
The first and most serious difficulty has been the lack of institutional 
coordination among State institutions and an absence of a permanent 
lead agency. For example, in the case of Claimant v. PetroVietnam,138 
PetroVietnam (PVN), which on behalf of government manages 
petroleum contracts, faced a claim by investors who challenged its 
refusal to grant a tax reduction for the operation of an offshore oil 
concession under a production sharing contract. Moreover, under the 
signed Petroleum Sharing Contract (PSC), as an additional element of 
the total fiscal package, there was a “stabilisation” clause provided that the 
investor should be secured where possible from the adverse economic 
effects of certain new statutes and regulations. This meant that the 
investors were entitled to apply for more favourable commercial terms 
subject to the approval of government, and PVN was obliged to assist 
its partners in obtaining such approval. Thus, it sought for a tax refund 
of approximately US$82 million by PVN – a national oil company.
In another tax related case in 2017, two Vietnamese oil fields were 
sold by two UK subsidiaries of ConocoPhillips to Perenco, with the 
135 Vietnam News (15 Dec 2018), ‘Vietnam courts should be more prepared to handle 
foreign investor v. State investment disputes’. Retrieved from https://vietnamnews.
vn/politics-laws/482114/viet-nam-courts-should-be-more-prepared-to-handle-
foreign-investor-v-state-investment-disputes.html [accessed 26 May 2020]
136 Nguyen, T. T. & Vu, T. C. Q. (2014), ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement from the 
Perspective of Vietnam: Looking for a “Post-Honeymoon” Reform’, Transnational 
Dispute Management, Vol. 11, issue 1, p. 01. Retrieved from https://www.transnational-
dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2041 [accessed 28 May 2020]
137 Ibid. 
138 Due to the confidentiality of this dispute, the paper cannot provide the detail of each 
relevant party and precise wording in their documentation.
value of US$1.29 billion, making a profit of US$896 million.139 Vietnam 
government believed that it had the right to tax this previously untaxed 
gain, as it was generated by exploiting the country’s oil resources 
under the UK-Vietnam double taxation treaty. These multinational 
oil companies have launched a pre-emptive legal strike, seeking to stop 
Vietnam from levying an estimated US$179 million (£140 million) in 
taxes on the profits made from the sale of oilfields in the country.140 
The dispute was submitted to the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court of arbitration, under the 
terms of the UK-Vietnam bilateral investment treaty. It was observed 
that such arbitration proceedings were secretive, expensive and that 
“Most of the potential arbitrators in tax-related cases are not tax experts 
or else are tax advisers to corporations, with insufficient experienced 
and non-partisan arbitrators from the developing world (such as 
academics) which “[as] a result is extremely difficult for developing 
country governments to secure the expertise they need to defend these 
cases”.141
The case was eventually settled via arbitration142 albeit at the time 
of writing this chapter, no details were made public. 
Such cases revealed that because of the lack of a permanent lead 
agency for ISDS, the preparation for ISDS proceedings was sluggish 
in the beginning. It took time for not only the Prime Minister to 
determine the ad hoc lead agency in each specific case, also for such a 
lead agency to understand the dispute in question to properly react to 
the ISDS proceedings as well as prepare a defense.143
In dealing with such challenge, the Vietnam’s Prime Minister 
enacted a regulation on ISDS coordination in 2014,144 which is 
replaced by the Decision No. 14/2020/QD-TTg dated 08 Apr 
139 UNCTAD, ‘ConocoPhillips and Perenco v. Viet Nam’, Investment Policy Hub. Retrieved 
from https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/906/
conocophillips-and-perenco-v-viet-nam [accessed 05 June 2020]
140 Ibid.
141 Turner G. (20 Aug 2018), ‘Analysis: How rich oil firms are using secretive court to fight 
capital gains tax in developing world’, Finance Uncovered. Retrieved from https://www.
financeuncovered.org/tax-havens/analysis-how-rich-oil-firms-are-using-secretive-
court-to-fight-capital-gains-tax-in-developing-world/ [accessed 05 June 2020]
142 Djanic V. (22 Jan 2020), ‘ConocoPhillips and Perenco Settle BIT Case Against Vietnam’, 
IAReporter. Retrieved from https://www.iareporter.com/articles/conoco-and-perenco-
settle-bit-case-against-vietnam/ [accessed 05 June 2020]
143 Nguyen T. T. & Vu T. C. Q., supra note 137, pp. 3-4.
144 Vietnam Prime Minister’s Decision No. 04/2014/QD-TTg dated 14 Jan 2014.
2020, which came into effect on 01 June 2020 (ISDS Regulation). 
The definition of lead agency is expressly provided as a Ministry, 
ministerial agency, Governmental agency or People’s Committee 
of a province or central-affiliated city (hereinafter referred to as 
“provincial People’s Committee”) that have a measure that a foreign 
investor claims against or threatens to claim against, excluding the 
case of other entity particularly assigned by the Prime Minister or 
the Ministry of Finance in relation to public debt management, 
application of law on finance and tax.145 The role of such lead agency 
in ISDS is mainly comprised of liaison hub and presiding over 
negotiations with foreign investor; presiding over and cooperating 
with the Government’s legal representative body and relevant bodies 
in resolving disputes; selecting and hiring lawyers; attending on 
behalf of Vietnamese government before the tribunal; and reporting 
to and being responsible with the Prime Minister during the whole 
ISDS process.146
Another obstacle faced by Vietnam was insufficient resources 
for defending ISDS cases, including human and financial resources. 
Almost all officials in charge of ISDS, particularly legal officials from 
the lead agency, did not have experience and expertise in international 
arbitration proceedings.147 To make up for the inexperience, Vietnam 
had to engage foreign law firms as outside counsel, and officials from 
relevant agencies needed to closely interact with outside counsel,148 
to assist in the collection of documents and evidence149 as well as 
in the preparation of ISDS strategies,150 submissions and hearings.151 
Furthermore, costs and fees for an ISDS case were usually high, i.e. 
millions of US dollars. It was not easy for a lead agency to secure 
these amounts from state budget to pay foreign law firms, experts and 
deposit for the costs of the arbitration.152
In overall, the ISDS Regulation establishes a clear mechanism 
for cooperation and coordination in ISDS in Vietnam during three 
phases, namely: conflict management, dispute resolution and award 
145 The Prime Minister’s Decision No. 14/2020/QD-TTg, Art.5.
146 Ibid., Art.6.
147 Nguyen T. T. & Vu T. C. Q., supra note 137, p. 5.
148 The Prime Minister’s Decision No. 14/2020/QD-TTg, Art.24.
149 Ibid., Art.18.
150 Ibid., Art.14.
151 Ibid., Arts.19, 20.
152 Nguyen T. T. & Vu T. C. Q., supra note 137, p.5
enforcement (as similar to the 2014 regulation). According to this 
Regulation, the function and duty of Ministry of Justice has been 
reinforced as the legal representative of Vietnam government for 
investment treaty-based disputes,153 and relevant entities have to 
coordinate comprehensively, actively and in a timely manner with 
the Ministry of Justice in specific ISDS process, including a pre-ISDS 
phase.154 It also requires both central and local agencies to improve 
their awareness not only in ISDS proceedings but also in the process 
of preventing and avoiding conflicts that may become disputes under 
investment treaties.
Although it will take time to assess the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the ISDS Regulation in ISDS and relevant dispute prevention in 
Vietnam, the Regulation is regarded as a cornerstone for Vietnam 
to prepare well for ISDS to protect legitimate rights and interests of 
Vietnam. In addition to this Regulation, Vietnam is in the process of 
amending the 2014 Law on Investment. This amendment is aiming at, 
among other things, better protection of investors and prevention of as 
well as minimising the risks of investment disputes.155
5.2. Recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards
Even though the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) 
came into force in Vietnam since 1995, there are significant concerns 
as to the extent to which foreign arbitration awards can be enforced 
in Vietnam. The ratio of applications for enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards which have been annulled by the Vietnamese courts is 
notably high. According to statistic of the Vietnam Supreme People’s 
Court, the court rejection accounts for 46% of applications for 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (24 out of 52) for the period 
of 2005 – 2014.156
After the issuance of the Supreme People’s Court Resolution 
01/2014/NQ-HDTP157 and the 2015 Civil Procedure Code (CPC),158 
153 The Prime Minister’s Decision No. 14/2020/QD-TTg, Art.2.4, Art.7.
154 Ibid., Art. 8.
155 Law on Investment No 61/2020/QH14 dated 17 June 2020.
156 Burkill S. (27 Apr 2020), ‘Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Vietnam’, Watson 
Farley & Williams. Retrieved from https://www.wfw.com/articles/enforcement-of-
foreign-arbitral-awards-in-vietnam/ [accessed 4 Jun 2020]
157 The Supreme People’s Court Resolution No. 01/2014/NQ-HDTP dated 20 March 
2014 guiding the implementation of Law on Commercial Arbitration.
158 Civil Procedure Code No. 92/2015/QH13 dated 25 November 2015.
which are designed to decrease the number of arbitral awards 
being unreasonably annulled and make Vietnam legal system more 
arbitration-friendly, it has witnessed a lower incidence of applications 
for enforcement being rejected, with the percentage of rejected 
application in Hanoi People’s Court decreased to 33% during 2014 – 
2017, and in Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court dropped down to 31% 
from 2011 to 2018.159
According to Article 459(1) of 2015 CPC the Courts shall not 
recognise a foreign arbitrator’s award when deeming that the evidences 
provided by the award debtors for appealing against the application for 
recognition are well-grounded and the arbitrator’s award falls within 
one of the stipulated cases. The most attributing cause of practical 
inefficiencies is that the burden of proof of award debtor has usually 
been shifted to award creditor to establish that the foreign award does 
not fall within the above cases. Considering the extensive scope of 
these cases, this has proven to be overwhelming to an award creditor.160
In addition, key consideration by Vietnamese courts for 
annulment of foreign arbitral awards could include the validity of 
arbitration agreement, capability to execute arbitration agreement, the 
notifications rendered to award debtors during the arbitral procedure, 
the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunal over the dispute, composition of 
the tribunal or arbitral procedure, the enforceability of arbitral award 
and whether the award is contrary to the fundamental principles of 
Vietnamese laws.161
The tendency of Vietnamese courts to refuse to enforce arbitral 
awards due to infringement of the basic principles of Vietnamese law 
has drawn the greatest concern.
“Article 459. Cases of non-recognition (of 2015 CPC)
…
2. A foreign arbitration award shall be refused to recognise when 
Vietnam’s Court considers that:
159 Burkill S., supra note 157.
160 Turksen U. & Chau Q. (2019), ‘To sign or not to sign? A conundrum of Vietnam’s 
accession to the ICSID’ Coventry Law Journal, 24(1), 2. [1].
161 Nguyen M. D (6 Dec 2018), ‘Enforcement of arbitral awards and other aspects 
of international arbitration in Vietnam’, Seoul. Retrieved from https://adr.com.
vn/upload/files/1130enforcementSeoul2018%20%5Bfor%20audiences%5D.pdf 
[accessed 4 Jun 2020].
(a) the dispute was not capable of being adjudicated by arbitration 
under Vietnamese law; and/or
(b) the recognition and enforcement in Vietnam of the foreign 
arbitrator’s award will be contrary to the basic principles of Vietnamese law.”
This provision uses the term ‘basic principles of Vietnamese law’ 
instead of ‘public policy’ as pursuant to Article V(2)(b) of the 1958 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York Convention).162 The term has been interpreted 
and applied arbitrarily by many Vietnamese courts in the past.
Firstly, the broad approach is that any breach of Vietnamese 
law, including primary legislation and delegated legislation, could be 
construed as being against the basic principles of Vietnamese law. For 
instance, in Energo – Novus v. Vinatex (1998), the court found that the 
Russian arbitration tribunal’s refusal to admit a notarised document 
submitted by the Vietnamese defendant contradicted a Vietnamese 
government decree supporting the validity of notarised documents. It 
thus refused to recognise the foreign tribunal’s award on that basis.163 
In another case, Tyco Services Singapore v. Leighton Contractors Vietnam 
(2003), the failure of contractor to register for ‘foreign contractor’ 
license in Vietnam under a Ministerial circular was held to constitute 
a violation of the fundamental principles of Vietnamese law and the 
request for recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award 
was consequently refused.164
Secondly, another way of interpretation of the phrase is that 
only a breach of primary legislation is deemed to be inconsistent with 
basic principles of Vietnamese law. Particularly, In Toepfer v. Sao Mai 
(2011), the Supreme Court held that the failure of the awarded party 
to mitigate its loss constituted a breach of the principle of good faith 
set out in Article 6 of the Civil Code. The court also held that the UK 
162 New York Convention, Art. V: “2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of that country.”
163 Energo – Novus Co (Russia) v. Vietnam Textile Corporation (Vinatext) [2000], Case 
No.58, Decision of the Appellate Court of the Supreme People’s Court of Vietnam 
in Hanoi.
164 Typo Services Singapore Pte Ltd v. Leighton Contractors (Vietnam) Ltd [2003], Decision 
No.02/PTDS, Decision of the Appellate Court of the Supreme People’s Court of 
Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City.
arbitration tribunal’s award of liquidated damages was contrary to the 
Civil Code’s provisions regarding actual damages and consideration of 
fault for civil liability; therefore, contrary to the principle set out in 
Article 11 of the Civil Code.165
For a more restrictive approach towards award enforcement, the 
Supreme People’s Court issued Resolution No 01/2014/NQ-HDTP 
providing guidelines for the Law on Commercial Arbitration. Pursuant 
to Article 14.2 of Resolution No 01/2014/NQ-HDTP: “the arbitral 
award is contrary to the basic principles of the law of Vietnam” means 
that the award violates basic principles on conduct, whose effects are 
most overriding in respect of the development and implementation of 
Vietnamese law”.
The Resolution No 01/2014/NQ-HDTP provides two additional 
criteria: the award has any content which is contrary to one or more 
basic principles of Vietnamese law and the award seriously violates 
interests of the government and/or violates the legitimate rights and 
interests of third party or parties. In the circumstance when the arbitral 
award meets these two criteria, the court may vacate that award with 
the justification of the violation of basic principles of Vietnamese 
laws.166
Moreover, other reason cited by the courts for refusing 16 cases 
in 2018 was that the award debtor had not been promptly and duly 
informed on the appointment of the arbitrators. For example, in 
Wisdom v. Hao Hung case, ad hoc arbitration in Hong Kong had sent 
notice by email to the staff of the award debtor rather than the legal 
representative of the award debtor. It is crucial for the courts to ensure 
that contractual notice provisions and notice requirements as prescribed 
by Vietnamese law are adhered to.167
Despite the efforts of Vietnam to provide and interpret the limited 
ground for refusal of foreign arbitral awards, the refusing cases are 
still too abstract and remain vague. The EU – Vietnam trade and 
investment agreements, particularly the provisions of tribunal system 
and enforcement mechanism should be an impetus to improve the 
certainty and efficiency of the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in Vietnam whereby Vietnamese courts shall carry out 
165 Toepfer v. Sao Mai [2011], Decision of the Appellate Court of the Supreme People’s 
Court of Vietnam in Hanoi.
166 The Resolution No 01/2014/NQ-HDTP, Art.14(2)(dd).
167 Burkill S., supra note 157.
the principle below in practice: “When considering the application for 
recognition and enforcement, the Panel [of Judges] shall not conduct a re-trial 
over the dispute when the foreign arbitrator’s award has been issued. The 
Court shall be only entitled to check and compare the foreign arbitrator’s award 
and accompanying papers and documents against the provisions of Chapter 
XXXV and Chapter XXXVII of this [Civil Procedure Code], other relevant 
provisions of Vietnamese law and international treaties to which the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam is a signatory to form the basis for the issuance of decision 
to recognise and enforce such award.”168
This article has reviewed the cardinal aims and objectives of the 
legal provisions of the recent bilateral trade agreements between the 
EU, a regional economic super power, and Vietnam, a transitional 
economy within an equally big regional trading block (ASEAN) albeit 
with less legal and political integration compared to the EU Single 
Market.
The critical analysis conducted in this paper provides a number 
of important and novel conclusions. First of all, the good governance 
standards and the rule of law principles that are enshrined in the EVFTA 
are likely to yield positive results only if they are practiced in good faith 
and in the spirit of these legal provisions. Secondly, these principles, 
if they are applied in practice of ITS effectively, are likely to provide 
additional safeguards and guarantees to investors whereby FDI flow to 
Vietnam would subsequently be increased in the coming years. Thirdly, 
the ITS regime provides a powerful incentive or a catalyst to review 
and modernize the domestic legal system of Vietnam and address the 
gaps which in turn would not only improve the investment eco-system 
(in terms of good governance and the rule of law) in Vietnam but pave 
the way for optimization of its economic potential and competitive 
power in the region (i.e. in the ASEAN). It would not be erroneous to 
posit that the earlier problems of the lack of institutional coordination 
in Vietnam are likely to be addressed given the importance of making 
the EVFTA and ITS a success story for all the parties involved. 
While the ITS regime emphasizes FET as a standard of investment 
protection, it applies to foreign investors only thus creates inequality 
for domestic/national investors which consequently presents an area to 
be addressed and reformed without delay.
168 2015 CPC, Art.438(4).
Despite such a shortcoming, the proposed legal processes are 
likely to result in a speedier, fair and effective settlement of disputes 
for foreign investors.
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